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Introduction
I
nterest in refugees who live in urban settings, especially
those of the global south, has developed fairly recently,
although refugees themselves have always been part of
urban society. In 2002, the Forced Migration and Refugee
Studies program at the American University in Cairo held a
workshop to explore some of the methodological and ethical
issues implicit in doing research among urban refugee popu-
lations in developing societies. Many of the papers in this
issue developed from this initial endeavour. However, it was
evident that the contributing authors had concerns with the
systemic context for urban refugees that went beyond the
epistemological aspects of the research process. In particu-
lar, the experiences of refugees in the cities described by
contributors—Kampala, Cairo, Johannesburg, Khar-
toum—are characterized by a high level of vulnerability
stemming from arbitrary and schizophrenic international
protection policies deriving from anxieties embodied by the
nation-state system.
This special issue is devoted to the analyses of political,
social, economic, and legal barriers for refugees in urban
settings, particularly as these shape the opportunities,
strategies, vulnerabilities,  and livelihoods of  refugees  in
African cities.  We  are  interested in framing the central
thrusts of the contributions through considering regional
urbanization, shifts in global patterns of refugee move-
ments, and transnationalism. State policies concerning im-
migration, naturalization, and citizenship produce some of
the structural factors shaping these complex developments,
although to a large degree they are the inevitable result of
globalization processes. The scholars whose work is repre-
sented here provide research-based evidence that policies
designed to manage the symptoms of refugees “out of
place” are unable to accommodate the fundamental chal-
lenge refugees pose to the nation-state system.
Clearly, state policies that tighten up borders, reduce
immigration, and limit access to citizenship are at odds with
regional processes of urbanization, increased population
movements globally, and the development of transnational
spaces, and urban refugees are caught in the middle. These
policies that attempt to make the presence of refugees in
urban—and national—settings illegitimate are counter-
productive inasmuch as they try to counteract irresistible
demographic trends.
In what follows we show that urbanization is an irre-
versible process in the African context, and that the move-
ment of refugees to urban areas can only make sense in this
context. Furthermore, state policies of segregation, securiti-
zation, and criminalization of urban refugees are inextricably
linked to the objectives of states to create and perpetuate
differences between insiders and outsiders—of which citi-
zenship is a key determinant. Generally, refugee law is the
exception to domestic immigration law because it allows
certain people to enter the territories of other states without
a visa or other requirements. In Africa, however, refugee law
is used as an instrument of exclusion and separation– but
only to hold up exclusive nationality law (Kagan in this issue).
As Kibreab points out in this issue, in nearly all developing
countries, refugees are received as temporary guests until the
conditions that prompted their displacement are eliminated.
Once the political conditions that caused displacement cease,
refugees are expected to return home regardless of the dura-
tion of exile. Spatial segregation of refugees is seen as an
important instrument of preventing refugees’ integration
into host societies by prolonging their refugee status. This
strategy is defeated if refugees are settled in urban area, and
helps explain why host countries in the South regulate the
presence of refugees in urban areas.
Finally, the authors in this issue describe the ways in
which refugees carve out a space under adverse conditions
not simply by reacting to unfavourable state policies and
practices but also through creative engagement and mobi-
lization of social networks in search of viable livelihoods,
often with a transnational dimension, against all odds.
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The urban spaces where the human consequences of
these ongoing developments are most starkly apparent are
the cities of the global South. The authors of these papers
have chosen to emphasize the African context for the dra-
matic contrast between global and regional developments
that support increased migration and population control
policies that stem from the rationale of the nation-state.
The rapid expansion of Cairo, for example, from a city of
half a million people in the 1940s to the eighteen million
plus of today is largely due to rural-urban migration. The
Egyptian state has sought to control and counteract this
process through denying permission for house-building,
slum-clearing, relocation of wholesale markets where rural
migrants make a living to the desert beyond city limits, and
other mechanisms of urban planning. The population of
Khartoum, on the other hand, has swelled due to famine
and war in other parts of the country; the Sudanese govern-
ment has reacted by criminalizing begging, bulldozing set-
tlements of displaced Sudanese and moving their people to
more distant sites, among other things. In both cases, mov-
ing to the capital city represents access to security, services,
and opportunities for citizens whose governments seek to
keep them in the provinces without any regard to their
physical safety and well-being.
Refugees who join the steady advance of people moving
to African and other Southern cities go for particular rea-
sons related to their search for safety, access to international
links (to receive remittances, for example), and options for
resettlement. However, the explorations of refugee experi-
ences and livelihoods offered by contributors to this issue
additionally illustrate that refugees choose urban areas for
the same reasons as citizens do. Even in the most poor
countries in Africa, the relationship between urban and
rural areas is marked by uneven development and skewed
distribution of opportunities for income-generation, edu-
cation, health care, housing, clean water supply, and sani-
tation, as well as transportation. Evidence abounds that the
level of income earned by urban dwellers, including those
who live in slum areas, is higher than in rural areas. As
might be expected, refugees—like other people—are stra-
tegic decision makers and may “vote with their feet” en
route for cities where chances of staying on the right side of
the razor’s edge of survival are better.
Another attraction of  the city is the  opportunity for
anonymity. In comparison to national urban dwellers, the
number of refugees in African cities is insignificant and, as
a result, they may be able to melt into the urban throng by
assuming fictive identities,1 especially if they share com-
mon language, ethnicity, and way of life. The benefit of
anonymity, besides providing physical security, enables
refugees to engage in different forms of income-generating
activities by hiding their true identity. In Sudan, for exam-
ple, according to the Sudanese Asylum Act 1974 refugees
are prohibited from leaving the officially designated places
of residence. They are also not allowed to own property or
to leave government-designated sites without permission.
There are tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees, especially
those who share common traits of ethnicity, religion, lan-
guage, and way of life with some members of the local
community in Eastern Sudan who own property, who live
in the cities, move freely and engage in diverse income-gen-
erating activities in defiance of the formal government
policies. Most of this would have been unachievable in a
rural setting, where people generally know each other and
associate with one another on the basis of common resi-
dence or descent.
This does not, however, suggest that all African refugees
can escape the tyranny of being “othered” by simply relo-
cating themselves to cities. Whilst in some African contexts,
such as Kassala, Kigoma, and even Dar es Salaam,2 refugees
are  able  to hide among  urban populations, passing for
nationals, in others they make up a visible minority. Suda-
nese, Eritrean, and Congolese refugees in Cairo are rou-
tinely singled out for harassment by security forces as well
as ordinary Egyptians. In either case, however, refugees are
unambiguously distinguished from citizens by their legal
status, rendering them ineligible for services and dependent
on the  beneficence  of the state  for residency rights. As
non-citizens, they are not perceived as part of the national
interest—they are seen as foreign objects in the body poli-
tic—and most policies are designed to control, contain, and
segregate them from the rest of the population. The acqui-
escence of their fellow urbanites to these policies is achieved
through state discourses and practices presenting refugees
as a threat in terms of state and societal security, competi-
tion for limited resources, and the personal safety of citi-
zens. We turn now to a discussion of state practices of
spatial segregation, securitization, and criminalization of
refugees in Africa with reference to international legal
mechanisms designed to inhibit refugees moving to cities.
The Tyranny of Spatial Segregation
The presence of refugees in urban areas is invariably op-
posed by governments in nearly all African receiving coun-
tries, with few exceptions.3 On the rest of the continent,
governments place refugees in spatially segregated sites
wherever possible. From the narrow perspective of state
interest, there are ostensibly well-thought-out policy objec-
tives underlying the decisions of governments concerning
spatial segregation of refugees. Kibreab and to some extent
Kagan (both in this  issue) identity  a number of  factors
underpinning such policies—namely, minimization of per-
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ceived risks to national security, prevention of refugee com-
petition for employment, self-employment, social services
(healthcare, education, sanitation), housing, and transpor-
tation; shifting of responsibilities for catering to the needs of
refugees to the refugee assistance system; creation of oppor-
tunities to develop previously neglected sites for lack of
resources; and prevention or minimization of societal inse-
curity—e.g. the alleged cultural, racial, and religious homo-
geneity of national populations (Kibreab in this issue). In
contrast to Northern state immigration policies, these meas-
ures actively prevent refugee integration into receiving so-
cieties.4
Notwithstanding the fact that these policies are formu-
lated and implemented in order to provide “solutions” to
the refugee problem in first countries of asylum, in reality,
they represent an obstacle to a solution by perpetuating
refugee status indefinitely. Worse still, spatial segregation
prevents refugees from contributing to the social and eco-
nomic progress of their receiving societies. If the presence
of refugees within the urban settings were to be regularized,
both refugees and their hosts could derive mutual benefits
stemming from the social, economic, cultural, and political
interactions that take place within an urban environment.
Displacement in the context of urban settings tends to
telescope processes of social change through which refu-
gees, under pressure, acquire new skills and occupations,
enter into new social relationships, and engage in economic
activities that they would have never contemplated.5 Gov-
ernments, by failing to realize the potential  benefits of
regularizing the presence of refugees in the urban areas, are
forgoing resources that could partially address the malaise
and economic decay that permeate African cities. The fol-
lowing example may shed some light on this. Successive
Sudanese governments restricted the possibility for
Eritrean refugees outside refugee camps and settlements to
obtain business licences. In the 1980s, one of the major
bottlenecks faced by the country’s economy was transpor-
tation. In the mid-1980s, the government allowed Eritrean
refugees to obtain licences in order to engage in the trucking
business. Within a short period, there were fleets of trucks
and trailers belonging to many Eritrean refugees who had
returned from the Gulf States, Europe, and North America
to invest their savings. Not only did this enable the refugees
concerned to earn incomes, but they also enabled the host
country to benefit from capital investment earned outside
of the country. However, this liberal policy did not last long.
One of the main reasons why subsequent government poli-
cies restricted the rights of refugees to engage in commercial
activities within the urban setting is due to the strongly
embedded but nevertheless unsubstantiated fear of threat
to national security that might be posed by the refugees. In
what follows we argue that one of the main arguments
African states use try to keep their cities clear of refugees is
to place the refugee question on the security agenda.
Securitization of the Presence of Refugees in
Urban Areas
There is an unmistakable tendency among governments in
developing countries, especially Africa, to characterize ur-
ban refuges as constituting an imminent threat to national
and societal security. When an issue is securitized, argue
Buzan et al., “it is presented as an existential threat, requiring
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the nor-
mal bounds of political procedure.”6 The securitization of
the presence of refugees in urban areas enables governments
to treat refugees in urban settings contrary to the principles
underlying the international instruments to which they are
parties, as well as national legislation relating to refugee
status and other domestic laws pertaining to human and
individual rights. This is because on the one hand, security
is represented as being a universal good that all members of
society should strive to achieve7 and on the other, draconian
measures used against refugees are justified by the alleged
need to avoid dangerous scenarios of insecurity from un-
folding. Not only does securitization threaten the well-being
of refugees due to arbitrary state action, but it also creates a
hostile environment for them by fostering paranoia and
xenophobia among nationals in urban areas.
Although the securitization of the presence of refugees
in urban areas is not a new phenomenon, it has intensified
as a result of a number of changes that have been occurring
on the continent. As outlined above, deteriorating living
conditions in most rural areas have been forcing Africans
to emigrate to cities in search of income-generating oppor-
tunities. These mass immigrations to urban areas have been
taking place in the absence of structural transformations of
urban economies (Kibreab this issue). As a result, a large
majority of rural immigrants end up in urban slums, plac-
ing enormous pressure on fragile or non-existent social and
physical infrastructures. The presence of refugees in urban
areas that are already under enormous pressure is seen by
governments and nationals as presenting a threat to eco-
nomic, social, and political security. Given the enormity of
economic, social, and infrastructural problems facing Afri-
can cities, and given the negligible number of urban refu-
gees, any sensible and informed debate would conclude by
recognizing that the problems facing African cities have
little or nothing to do with the presence of refugees.
When Africa was gripped by the “democratization proc-
ess” following the end of the Cold War, many expected that
the factors that produced forced migrations would come to
an end—and that the victimization of refugees in urban
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areas would also cease—due to commitment of govern-
ments and citizens to the sanctity of the rule of law and
human rights. This did not happen, as the example of Sudan
makes very clear. Multi-party elections and freedom of the
press and of expression that accompanied democratization
have had unexpected but nevertheless detrimental conse-
quences for the well-being of urban refugees. Parliamentar-
ian candidates blamed the acute shortages in employment,
housing, transportation, hospital beds, medicines, school
places, and strategic commodities such as sugar, oil, etc. on
refugees. Journalists and some vocal citizens unleashed an
assault against urban refugees—and social scientists on the
front lines8—during the infamous 1987 kesha campaign
unleashed by the democratically elected al-Mahdi govern-
ment against refugees.9 Refugees were subjected to round-
ups, arbitrary  detention, extortion, imposition of heavy
penalties, etc. for allegedly imposing an “unbearable bur-
den” on the social, economic, and physical infrastructures
of the capital city and for “polluting” the “purity” of the
Islamic way of life of Sudanese society.10 It is not only in
Sudan that the surge of democracy brought about system-
atic anti-refugee attitudes; this was equally true in Tanzania
and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.11
It is often assumed that refugees face racism and dis-
crimination only in the North. This belief rests upon the
assumption, often reflected in international refugee policies
for managing refugee flows in the South, that refugees and
their hosts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia share com-
mon ethnic and socio-cultural characteristics and that refu-
gees are therefore unlikely to face racial discrimination or
prejudice. Nothing could be further from the truth. When
a particular group, e.g. refugees, is labelled as “pollutants”
and a “burden,” its members are singled out for harassment
and prejudicial treatment in the same way as are members
of a particular ethnic or racial category. While the raciali-
zation of immigrants and refugees—and thus the rationale
for exclusion—has been a recognized development in
Europe,12 there is ample evidence to show that refugees in
the South face discrimination and unfair treatment by vir-
tue of being “outsiders” or non-citizens.13 As we suggest in
the following section, one mechanism for pursuing exclu-
sionary policies at the state level is to link refugee popula-
tions with criminality.
Criminalization of Refugees in Urban Areas
Throughout Africa, refugee policies and assistance pro-
grams are almost exclusively focused on providing protec-
tion and assistance to refugees residing in rural camps and
settlements.14 To access these resources refugees are re-
quired to settle in government-designated places. These
places are more often than not located in remote rural areas.
When designating a particular site for a refugee camp or
settlement, host governments rarely take the needs of par-
ticular refugees into account. Those refugees who have pre-
viously never lived in  rural  areas, many  of  them urban
professionals, may well consider settlement in such unfamil-
iar places unacceptable; such refugees spare no effort to
subvert the policies and practices of host governments that
are formulated and implemented without any regard to their
skills and needs.
Many governments allege that refugees in urban areas
are inclined to engage more often in “corrupt practices”
than their counterparts in rural areas, and are thus crimi-
nalized. However, for those refugees who seek to escape
from rural refugee camps and settlements, no legal avenues
exist to relocate in urban areas. The only way to avoid being
confined to these, in their view, inhospitable places is either
through illegal departures or through payment of bribes to
obtain travel permits. Once they  relocate themselves to
urban centres, refugees are forced to resort to “illegal”
means of obtaining residence permits by bribing govern-
ment officials directly or through middlemen. Many refu-
gees in urban areas also pay exorbitant fees to obtain forged
residence permits.
As is clear from the empirical research presented in this
special issue—and recognized by the UNHCR—one of the
reasons refugees prefer urban areas to rural camps and
settlements  is  to try to  realise their aspiration of being
resettled in one of the prosperous countries of the North.
Since most avenues for legal immigration or resettlement15
are closed, refugees—as well as nationals in search of a
better life—resort to a myriad of illegal means of obtaining
forged visas, passports, and travel and other documents.
Not only are most of these illegal activities undertaken in
collusion with host countries’ officials and security forces,
more importantly, it is the lack of consideration of the
needs of refugees and the inappropriateness of host govern-
ment policies and practices that compel refugees to disre-
gard and disrespect such policies in the first place. Florencia
Belvedere (in this issue) hits the nail on the head when she
states:
Despite the Department’s engagement in a protracted status
determination process that enables both the presence of “abus-
ers” in the asylum system and often drives desperate asylum
seekers and refugees to engage in corrupt practices to secure
access or documentation in the face of perpetual delays, it has
become more politically expedient for the Department to por-
tray asylum seekers as fraudsters and abusers of the system who
are responsible for the failure of the asylum procedure than to
admit that its own practices are working to undermine the
asylum procedure…
Volume 24 Refuge Number 1
6
In the following we examine the reasons that underlie
African refugees’ decisions to move to cities in spite of the
restrictions, harassment, extortion, and threats of arbitrary
detention and deportation they face at the hands of host
governments’ officials.
The Appeal of Cities for Refugees
Marfleet (in this issue)16 points out that refugees have been
part of the urban landscape throughout history for a variety
of reasons. Some of these reasons have undoubtedly to do
with generic processes of urbanization and the concentra-
tion of resources in one place. The contributions here also
suggest a number of motives that refugees have for choos-
ing—often in the face of bureaucratic, legal, and political
obstacles—to move to cities (Lammers in this issue). As
mentioned earlier, urban space provides anonymity and
therefore greater personal security for refugees, a point made
effectively by Sommers in his ethnography of fearful young
refugees in  Dar  al-Salaam. The encampment  policies  of
states and international agencies mean that refugees origi-
nating from a given country are placed in the same site. Some
of these groups may be former enemies and can easily target
each other. The urban space, by providing an opportunity
for anonymity, provides some degree of physical security.
There is evidence to show that camps are insecure places
in other ways. They can be targeted by countries of origin
or by opposition groups or liberation armies, e.g. the refu-
gee camps in northern Uganda. Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) cadres also targeted southern Sudanese for-
mer combatants who escaped from the frontlines and set-
tled in refugee camps. Before the demise of apartheid, the
African National Congress (ANC) and the other liberation
fronts in southern Africa had free access to the refugee
camps in the neighbouring countries. They routinely vic-
timized dissidents and alleged enemy informants. Those
who  feared retribution,  invariably  voted  with their  feet
towards cities where they could lead anonymous lives.
When host countries are allies of liberation movements, e.g.
Uganda and SPLA, the former may indirectly or directly
facilitate the latter’s access to refugee camps for recruitment
or other purposes. In this issue, Bernstein and Okello point
to the vulnerability refugees face in refugee settlements in
Uganda as one of their main motivations to locate in urban
areas.
There is also the important—and regularly over-
looked—issue of what refugees, as human beings with his-
tories, desires, and aspirations, want for themselves. The
view of most scholars and practitioners who have analyzed
encampment policies, as summed up by Richard Black,17 is
that the majority of benefits of the practice accrue to agen-
cies, states, and other bodies whose objectives are to manage
refugees. Limitations to autonomy, freedom of movement,
and the institutionalization of refugee livelihoods are
widely believed to have detrimental effects on well-being,
although naturally camp settings also provide advantages
for some refugees or in some circumstances. Specifically,
settlements with land available for cultivation by refugees
whose former livelihoods depended on agriculture may
provide economic opportunity and reassuring stability for
a person with a disrupted life. For refugees with particular
social, professional, and/or educational backgrounds, who
may have no previous experience making a living by culti-
vating, camps can be quite cruel and demoralizing places.
They are marked by complete absence of opportunities for
employment, post-primary school education, good quality
health care, etc. Refugees who previously worked in the
modern sector, including professionals, see no future for
themselves or their children in these places. The urban
setting holds a natural attraction.
For many such refugees in Africa, cities are places where
people can search out services, employment, and safety.
Despite the persecution faced by refugees in urban areas at
the hands of national and local authorities, there are still
greater opportunities for eking out a living than in rural
areas. It is also clear from the contributions to this issue that
refugees see the presence of international agencies, embas-
sies, and NGOs with an advocacy brief as a means of nego-
tiating other possibilities, such as relocation to a
resettlement country. Several of the case studies in this
issue18 illustrate the preoccupation with obtaining the nec-
essary legal status to enable refugees to travel to Europe,
North America, or Australia—even if the possibilities are
remote. Currie, for example, describes  the strategies of
Sudanese refugees in Cairo to acquire resettlement status
through marriage and the significance of this status as a
source of power in the marriage market. Al-Sharmani
shows, furthermore, that refugees with resettlement ambi-
tions move to cities in order to prepare themselves for life
in the North—by taking English and computer classes, for
example. The employment opportunities for young So-
malis in her study also bear out the prospect of earning
sums of money unimaginable in a camp setting—such as
babysitting for American families in Cairo, who pay refugee
domestic workers in foreign currency. These young people
aspire to follow the footsteps of others in the Somali dias-
pora to cities—and citizenship possibilities—in the North.
Some of Lammers’s subjects of study are artists who run a
successful art centre in Kampala (this issue). Without relo-
cating themselves to a city, they would have been unable to
develop their skills and knowledge—and a market for their
art in Europe. A final example of the opportunities found
almost exclusively in cities is the availability of transna-
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tional banking.19 Since the incomes of most of the refugees
in the  areas covered  in this issue are supplemented by
members of their diasporic  communities in the  North,
living within the urban space facilitates easier, faster, and
more effective transnational communications and interac-
tions.
Globalization, Transnationalism, and Urban
Refugees
The marginalized position of urban refugees, particularly in
the South, cannot be separated from the mounting pace of
globalization and increasing levels of disparity between the
North and South. This issue’s contributions show how cities
in the South serve as “staging grounds” for refugees in transit
from one state to another, either through agency-sponsored
resettlement programs or via smugglers. In addition to ne-
gotiating movement into and between cities, urban refugees
also become participants in global flows of information,
finance (through remittances), and cultural practices. De-
spite the interconnectedness promised by the relative ease of
communication and travel, refugees living in the African
cities described in this issue are severely disadvantaged by
their location on the global hierarchy of legal status, which
places citizens of Northern states in a considerably superior
position in terms of ease of travel and access to resources,
among other things. While citizenship is not the only means
of calculating the advantages of belonging,20 there is a global
“market” for privileged nationalities that, when acquired,
provide urban refugees with direct or indirect benefits.
States in which it is possible to gain full membership are,
with few exceptions, those of North America, Europe, and
Australia. In contrast, the African and Middle Eastern coun-
tries in which the urban refugees in this issue are based do
not allow naturalization of non-citizens despite the recent
provenance and artificiality of their national borders. Expec-
tations of “local integration” for refugees living in London,
Vancouver, Amsterdam, Sydney, and New York are only
possible because immigrants  are able—at least  theoreti-
cally—to acquire the legal rights of citizens and the possibil-
ity of full citizenship. Refugees residing in Cairo,
Johannesburg, Khartoum, and Kampala have no chance of
becoming Egyptians, South Africans, Sudanese, or Ugan-
dans, with the national rights and access to resources,
though fewer than those of the North, that this implies.
Seen in terms of state policy towards urban refugees in
the South, such global inequality provides at least a partial
explanation of not only why they are excluded from most
services but also why they pose such a perceived threat to
Northern states. Kagan’s analysis of refugee status determi-
nation processes (RSD) notes that Northern states have an
interest in keeping the definition of what constitutes refu-
gee status narrow to maintain control of immigration,
whereas African states have preferred a broader definition
(as enshrined in the 1969 OAU Convention relating to the
Specific Aspects of the African Refugee Problem, for exam-
ple), because it serves the purpose of shifting the responsi-
bility for refugees onto international agencies. Kagan also
argues that this has the additional effect of depoliticizing
the movement of large numbers of people. As both Kagan
and Kibreab point out, this state-led strategy leads directly
to policies of spatial segregation whereby encamped refu-
gees are “manageable” by international agencies and host
governments.
If there are important structural differences between the
North and the South which shape global patterns of move-
ment and differential access to citizenship between nations,
cities at the same time comprise nodes in transnational
refugee networks. In the absence of access to state spon-
sored resources, including the formal job market, transna-
tional networks make it possible for refugee
individuals—and families—to create local livelihoods
through remittances, for example, and develop strategies
for the long-term improvement of their circumstances.
Al-Sharmani’s ethnographic research with diasporic So-
mali families clearly shows the importance of citizenship in
a Northern country for the survival—thousands of miles
away in Cairo—of urban Somali refugee families. Signifi-
cantly, the benefits accruing to family members through the
support of their relatives in London, Toronto, Amsterdam,
and elsewhere do not come without tension as individuals
are required to put their own desires—for emigration to the
North, for example—aside for “the good of the family.”
Given that Somalis and other refugees cannot be granted
Egyptian citizenship, with the political, economic, and so-
cial integration this implies, Somalis in Cairo instead pur-
sue their  goal of  citizenship in other places by seeking
Somali marriage partners with beneficial passports, study-
ing English, and negotiating with their transnational family
members for funding to pay a person smuggler.
Transnational networks benefit newly arrived refugees
by connecting them with people who can help them survive
in  hostile urban  environments. Kin, village, neighbour-
hood, and ethnic links between cities and countries—and
connecting cities with refugee camps and home regions,
provide refugees with information, food, and shelter. This
“bridging social capital” is discussed by D’Addario et al.,
who point out that  a percentage of refugees do not or
cannot avail themselves of the housing resources that the
Greater Vancouver city district provides refugee newcom-
ers, sheltering instead with contacts from their pre-existing
transnational networks. Bernstein and Okello show that
cities play an important role regionally as nodes of trans-
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portation and information for fleeing refugees, who often
bypass camps on their way to urban areas.
Conclusion
The issue of urban refugees has received well-deserved at-
tention in recent years as an analytical category as well as a
policy concern. The oft-cited re-evaluation by the UNHCR
of its 1997 Policy on Urban Refugees is a welcome indication
of the growing concern with the discriminatory treatment
of refugees in urban areas of the South, both in terms of
protection and aid. As Kagan points out in this issue, the
UNHCR’s mandate is not location-specific. Yet Belvedere’s
observations of a hostile refugee bureaucracy in South Africa
describing a UNHCR beholden to state policies of exclusion
reveals a complex double standard whereby refugee status
accorded to people living in urban areas does not provide
adequate protection. By portraying refugees who move to
urban areas as opportunistic, violent, maladjusted, and cul-
tivating a culture of expectation, the UNHCR, like the state
interests it represents, legitimates such policies
The recent focus on refugee livelihoods in urban areas
directs policy consideration towards the economic and
other benefits that urban refugees provide is a welcome
refugee-centred approach.21 However, policies which de-
fine urban refugees in terms of a challenge to existing
responses and requiring a different sort of management
nevertheless frame refugees as a “problem.” If, as the arti-
cles in this issue illustrate, even internationally recognized
refugees live in insecurity on the margins of urban societies,
the difficulty in establishing sustainable livelihoods be-
comes brutally apparent. D’Addario et al. show that even in
a Northern city like Vancouver, refugees rely upon their
transnational connections to local networks; refugees in
Kampala, in contrast, face the real danger of destitution due
to the insecurity of their situation, as shown by Bernstein
and Okello, as well as Lammers. Livelihoods are only as
sustainable as a person’s security and access to resources.
Were it not for state-sanctioned controls and restrictions in
Africa and other regions of the global South stemming from
the definition of refugees as ineligible for citizenship, refu-
gees would be able to establish sustainable livelihoods by
developing “bridging social networks” with local hosts22
and tapping onto their own transnational connections, in
turn helping to develop host societies. The concept of urban
refugees as a “burden” despite their tiny numbers is a result
of inappropriate policies, including UNCHR status deter-
mination which reinforces state-sanctioned exclusion. So-
cial capital, which can be developed only in conditions of
inclusion, is therefore crucial for the development of sus-
tainable livelihoods.
The contributions to this special issue take a historical
and global perspective that critically analyze the processes
and constraints shaping the urban environments within
which they pursue livelihoods in terms of the political
framework of borders, citizenship, and urbanization. Fail-
ing to recognize the complex realities which have generated
the current context for urban refugees in the South con-
strains policy makers within the paradigm of the refugee-
as-problem. The tendency of governments, noted early on
by Kibreab, to deny the existence of refugees as “what the
eye refuses to see”23 has been increasingly challenged by
urban refugees themselves, who have demanded that their
claim to protection be noticed. Marfleet (this issue) has
catalogued a number of protests in cities around the world
whereby refugees have demanded an end to their invisibil-
ity. The transnational networks of which urban refugees in
the South are part also link them to the cities and states of
the North, connecting North and South through urban
nodes of a global system of flows. As Lammers points out,
the repercussions of the global actions and discourses
whose centres of power lie historically in the nation-states
of the North render all of us the products of violent histo-
ries. Urban refugees in the South must be contemplated in
this light.
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